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Who speaks for Islam?: ‘authenticity’ and the
interpretation of Islamic law in America’s war on
terror
MATTHEW J. NELSON
Recognising that America’s response to the events of 11 September would do
well to maintain a sharp distinction between the ‘war on terror’ and a war
‘against Islam’, this article argues that American diplomatic rhetoric would
benefit from an explicit effort to engage ‘frameworks of legitimacy’ within
Islam, including the terms of Islamic jurisprudence and Islamic legal debate.
The article examines the merits of such an approach in the context of several
recent diplomatic dilemmas, including the Jyllens-Posten cartoon contro-
versy. It concludes with an assessment of the American (domestic) political
environment within which this approach tends to encounter its most ardent
critics.
Introduction
‘I am probably not the person to go into the Muslim community [to] explain . . .
that [an] extreme view [of Islam] is not the true face of Islam’, noted British
Prime Minister Tony Blair during a meeting with the Liaison Committee of the
House of Commons in July 2006 (BBC News Online 2006). Instead, he argued,
‘it’s better that we mobilise the Islamic community itself to do this.’ In effect,
Blair argued, drawing attention to an increasingly familiar refrain: only
Muslims can succeed in convincing other Muslims to halt the advance of
religious extremism in their midst; only Muslims can succeed in convincing
other Muslims to embrace the language of modern human rights. As the battle
for Muslim hearts and minds rages on, Blair’s comments seemed to illuminate
a surprisingly resilient attachment to notions of cultural ‘authenticity’
or ‘exclusivity’ in the battle against religious extremism and violence*/an
attachment that students of culture, students of religion, and students of
cultural and religious change have long since abandoned.
For several years, scholars with an interest in globalisation, immigration,
cultural transformation, race, gender, sexuality, and contemporary religion
have gone out of their way to interrogate the notion that groups are, somehow,
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7 sealed unto themselves. They have been particularly critical of those who cling
to the notion that the sources of cultural and discursive change lying behind
contemporary expressions of group identity are primarily, or exclusively,
‘internal’ sources of change. Instead, they point to an accumulating body of
evidence suggesting that the boundaries associated with a particular group, and
the sources of change that might affect that group, are astonishingly diverse.
Social identity and social norms, they explain, are ‘socially constructed’ (many
times over), and the actors who participate in this process are themselves many
and varied. There is, in other words, no such thing as an ‘identity island’. Each
group is dynamically, discursively, and directly connected to its ‘Others’ (see
Sassen 1996; Anderson 1983; Brubaker 1996).
This article asks whether, considerable strides in constructivist thinking about
the nature of group identity notwithstanding, important actors like Blair have
failed to embrace the lessons of contemporary cultural theory in the context of
America’s (global) ‘war on terror’. In particular, it asks whether a deeper
appreciation for the dynamic boundaries of Muslim identity and, more
specifically, the interpretive scope of Islamic law, might be used to open up
new avenues of discursive and, more specifically, diplomatic engagement with
individual Muslims around the world. Can a deeper level of discursive
engagement with the terms of Islam*/and, more specifically, a deeper under-
standing of Islamic law, Islamic jurisprudence, and Islamic legal debate*/help
those with an interest in winning the battle for Muslim ‘hearts and minds’
around the world?
Following a brief discussion of what I will call ‘the problem of authenticity’ in
contemporary international relations (IR) theory*/drawing special attention to
the work of Jean-Franc¸ois Bayart (2005)*/this article turns to a more extensive
discussion of contemporary diplomatic rhetoric regarding the terms of Islamic
law, Islamic jurisprudence, and Islamic legal debate, focusing, primarily, on the
extent to which this rhetoric appears to remain bound up with a set of
theoretically outdated assumptions regarding (a) the boundaries of Islamic law
itself and (b) the discursive barriers that might exist between this law and the
rhetoric of American diplomacy.
The article then uses a series of well-known case studies drawn from recent
diplomatic history*/for example, the Jyllens-Posten cartoon controversy*/to
carve out a new approach to the rhetorical space ‘in between’ the terms of (a)
Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh) and (b) American diplomacy. Cutting straight to the
chase, I argue that a new approach to this rhetorical space ‘in between’ might
allow for a more constructive pattern of diplomatic engagement in which
American interlocutors seize new opportunities, not merely to observe but,
actually, to integrate the terms of Islamic law and Islamic legal debate even
within the context of their own diplomatic rhetoric.
I conclude with an account of the domestic political environment in the US
that has, so far, served as the most persistent barrier to a more extensive
investigation of this potentially fruitful space ‘in between’. This space is filled
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7 with diplomatic potential, but, as I explain, this space has been systematically
crowded out by what must be regarded as theoretically outdated notions of
cultural ‘exclusivity’, religious ‘authenticity’, and modern political ‘identity’.
Empirical context: responding to 11 September
After several years of detailed ethnographic and archival research on matters
relating to Islam, Islamic law, and local politics in Pakistan, I was sitting in
Islamabad when the twin towers fell in New York on 11 September 2001.
Recognising immediately that America’s response would do well to maintain a
sharp distinction between the ‘war on terror’ and a war ‘against Islam’,
my thoughts initially focused on the extent to which careful military planning
would have to be combined with a parallel effort to build substantial
political support throughout the Muslim world. In particular, cutting sharply
against the conventional wisdom, I noted that a special effort to understand
specific debates within the context of Islamic law might permit US diplomats
and US foreign policy-makers to harness local notions of authority in
the context of their ongoing efforts to define, and pursue, an effective response
to the events of 11 September. Such an effort, I argued, would provide for
the construction of a rhetorical ‘bridge’ between the United States and
several hundred million moderate-but-religious Muslim allies around the
world.1
In any legal system worthy of the name, I noted, an indiscriminate attack
against innocent people*/one as cowardly and as heinous as the attacks on 11
September*/must be regarded as a terrible crime. In Arabic, for instance, this is
the crime of hirabah, or ‘terrorism’, punishable by death. In fact, I argued, the
case against Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda could easily be defined and
pursued in multiple legal languages at the same time, for example, in both
Islamic and secular terms (simultaneously).2 This approach, I noted, would
merely reinforce the consensus of legal opinion against al-Qaeda in several (very
different) parts of the world.
In the autumn of 2001, however, this view was simply dismissed out of hand.
The overwhelming majority of my non-Muslim colleagues, both in Islamabad
and the US, insisted that ‘the language of Islam’ and, more specifically, the
language of ‘Islamic law’, was not an essential part of the solution. It was, they
argued, an intrinsic part of the problem. Among many observers, this
perception remains largely unchanged. And indeed, this is the perception that
I intend to challenge in the pages that follow. Five years on, as Islamic law takes
its place, not only in the constitutional framework of Afghanistan, but also in
Iraq (notwithstanding explicit American opposition to this development in both
countries), the time has finally come to reconsider (and reject) the conventional
wisdom I encountered in the autumn of 2001.
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7 Theoretical context: Islamic law and the question of ‘authenticity’
Different people dismiss the terms of Islamic law, Islamic jurisprudence, and
Islamic legal debate for different reasons. Max Weber (1978), for instance,
drawing attention to the terms of what he called ‘qadi’ justice, argues that local
articulations of Islamic law are simply too unpredictable to merit any close
comparison with the ‘modern’ legal establishment. In effect, he notes, the terms
of Islamic jurisprudence tend to be rather arbitrary, unreliable, and capricious.
Bernard Lewis (2002), on the other hand, presents a very different view,
suggesting that the terms of Islamic law and Islamic jurisprudence have
remained more or less unchanged for several centuries. Whereas Weber believes
that the terms of Islamic law are ‘too flexible’, then, Lewis seems to believe that
Islamic law is ‘not nearly flexible enough’ (Weber 1978; Lewis 2002).
Individual Muslims disagree about the underlying terms of fiqh, or
‘jurisprudence’, just as vigorously, focusing, specifically, on the extent to which
Islamic jurisprudence should be regarded as ‘responsive to historical change’,
‘open to external influences’, ‘confined to the interpretation of state-sponsored
experts’, and so on. These disagreements are not at all unfamiliar. A closer look
reveals an interesting (albeit unexpected) parallel between these ‘internal’
Muslim debates and the debates articulated nearly every day by US Supreme
Court Justices Antonin Scalia and Stephen Breyer. The Islamic ‘strict construc-
tionists’, for instance, following Scalia, are often accused of reinforcing the
notion that Islamic law is hopelessly anachronistic: ‘trapped in the tenth
century’ and so on. Those who attempt to ‘legislate from the bench’,
interpreting the law in light of new circumstances, following Justice Breyer,
on the other hand, are often accused of seeking to reinforce the unpredictable
legacy of Weber’s ‘qadi’ justice. (More often than not, these two lines of
criticism are actually combined in American representations of Islamic law,
such that, for instance, renegade Taliban-style mullahs are blamed for
‘legislating from the bench’ in a distinctively modern way*/that is, a
distinctively state-centric way*/that, somewhat ironically, attempts to carry
unwitting believers ‘back to the tenth century’.)
The fact of the matter, however, lies in realising that Islamic law is neither
‘too fixed’ nor ‘too flexible’ in any specific, absolute, or permanent sense.
Instead, it amounts to an enormously rich and sophisticated legal tradition,
packed with internal disputation of the most sophisticated variety and engaged
with external influences of the most diverse and dynamic sort. This is really the
main point*/the point of departure, if you will, for the rest of my argument.
Indeed, my argument lies in suggesting that, when it comes to American
diplomatic rhetoric, there is much to be gained*/and little (if anything) to be
lost*/from a more nuanced pattern of understanding and engagement with
what amounts to an extremely elaborate, sophisticated, and dynamic legal
tradition.
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7 To argue that Islamic jurisprudence is not bound up with a dynamic legal
tradition*/to argue, in effect, that Islamic law and Islamic jurisprudence remain
‘trapped in the tenth century’ or somehow ‘fixed’ in ways that are (ironically)
purely arbitrary*/merely reflects a view that no longer carries any theoretical or
empirical weight in the study of Islamic law. Indeed, to argue that Islamic law
and Islamic jurisprudence are not part of an elaborate, sophisticated, and
dynamic legal tradition is to embrace a notion of cultural, religious, and legal
‘authenticity’ or ‘essentialism’ that most scholars abandoned 20 or even 30
years ago.
Following the publication of Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978), the terms of
Islamic law, Islamic society, or Islamic ‘civilisation’ are no longer regarded as
intractable, inscrutable, unchanging, exotic, or exclusive*/occasional rhetorical
aspirations notwithstanding. Instead, the terms of Islamic law and society are
widely understood to be firmly embedded within a complex matrix of influence,
negotiation, interpretation, flux, and change (see, for example, Abou El
Fadl 2004; Esposito 1982; Jackson 1996, 2002; and many others). Indeed,
the terms of Islamic law, like the terms of ‘identity’ itself, are widely understood
to emerge, in a particular time and place, as the product of a particular socially
constructed interaction.
Bayart (2005) discusses this socially constructed process, as it relates to the
construction of ‘identity’, in some detail. There is, he admits, a rather
conventional and pernicious assumption that ‘authentic’ cultural identities
actually exist. Even beyond this, he notes that scholars tend to assume a natural
correspondence between these fixed ‘cultural identities’ and specific ‘political’
interests. By way of example, he simply echoes the familiar words of Blair
(above) in the language of a French minister speaking before the National
Assembly, in Paris, about the unfolding crisis in Rwanda (during the 1990s).
‘They are Blacks’, noted the minister, drawing attention to a rather familiar
construction of ‘fixed’ social identities, and ‘we are Whites’. ‘That is why we
must not intervene in Rwanda’ (quoted in Bayart 2005: xi). In effect, the
minister argued, each group has its own (separate) problems, and by extension,
its own (separate) solutions.
As Bayart is quick to point out, however, these assumptions regarding
‘separate’ identities and fixed notions of cultural ‘authenticity’ are merely
assumptions. ‘Each of these [‘authentic’] identities is at best a cultural
construct’, Bayart explains. In the final analysis, there is no such thing as
‘identity’ per se; ‘there are only strategies based on identity’ or, rather, strategies
based on an effort to protect and preserve what Bayart refers to as ‘the illusion
of identity’ (Bayart 2005: ix/x). If we take a closer look, he argues, we are not
left with identities; instead, we are left with various forms of interaction,
interpretation, and (above all) interconnection and intercommunication: what
Bayart refers to as ‘interconnections without isomorphism’ (Bayart 2005: 242).
This is already a familiar idea for students of constructivism in IR theory.
Unfortunately, the relationship between this argument and the work of those
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7 who study the international politics of the Muslim world has not received much
attention. Scholars like Lawrence Rosen (1989, 1999), writing about the terms
of Islam, Islamic law, and Islamic legal debate in Morocco; Brinkley Messick
(1993), writing about the terms of Islamic jurisprudence in Yemen; Daniel
Brown (1996), writing about Islamic jurisprudence in Egypt and Pakistan;
Michael G. Peletz (2002), writing about Islamic law in Malaysia; and John R.
Bowen (2003), writing about Islam in Indonesia have all gone out of their way
to show that the notion of Islamic law as a ‘fixed’ or ‘impenetrable’ law set
apart from specific historical circumstances and multiple legal (and political)
influences is little more than an ‘illusion’. An illusion, perhaps, devoted to the
strategic construction of an ‘essential’ or ‘authentic’ Islamic identity, but an
illusion nevertheless. The fact of the matter, they agree, is actually quite
different. Indeed, following Bayart, each points to what can only be described as
an extremely nuanced legal conversation*/a conversation between and among
different Muslim sects; between and among different schools of fiqh and the
legal institutions of the modern (secular) state; between and among men and
women, Muslims and non-Muslims, Sufis, Salafis, and so on.
The question that will be addressed in the remainder of this article picks up
on this notion of an extended and elaborate legal conversation: how can this
understanding of Islamic law and Islamic jurisprudence as a complex legal
conversation be combined with ongoing efforts to move beyond what Bayart
refers to as the ‘substantialist definitions of identity’ that underlie the ‘culturalist
diplomacy’ of the West (Bayart 2005: 242, 245/6; Sassen 1996; Appadurai
1996, 2006)? Indeed, how can the terms of Islamic law and Islamic
jurisprudence as a complex legal conversation come to be regarded, not as
fixed or impenetrable or exclusive, but rather, as a dynamic (diplomatic)
resource? Is it possible that, building on this notion of a complex legal
conversation, American diplomats might begin to draw upon the merits of
‘more than one legal idiom’ at the same time in the context of their approach to
America’s ongoing ‘war on terror’? Is it possible that the terms of Islamic law,
Islamic jurisprudence, and Islamic legal debate might come to be regarded, not
simply as an inscrutable part of the ‘problem’, but rather, as an integral part of
the ‘solution’?
Such an approach, I argue, is both possible and desirable. However, such an
approach is also unlikely owing to specific political barriers that emerge in the
context of American domestic politics.
Islamic law: avoidance versus engagement
The notion that this rather nuanced and sophisticated legal conversation within
Islam might be regarded as a valuable political resource in the context of
American diplomatic rhetoric is not widespread. On the contrary, most
American diplomats (Muslim and non-Muslim alike) continue to maintain a
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7 studied distance from the terms of Islamic law and Islamic jurisprudence*/all
the while insisting that their work in the context of America’s ‘war on terror’ is,
in no way, a war ‘against Islam’. Indeed, the specific benefits associated with a
deeper understanding of Islamic law and Islamic jurisprudence have not
emerged as the subject of any vigorous (high-level) debate.
The specific ways in which the Islamic legal tradition has been removed from
the terms of existing foreign policy debates, however, deserve some attention.
There are at least two major perspectives on the role of this tradition in the
context of America’s war on terror*/and, as a general rule, both perspectives
grow out of an essentialising view of Islamic law that aims to keep the US
strictly ‘set apart’ from the specific terms of fiqh.
Non-engagement strategy no. 1: Muslim law for Muslims
The first view, what I call non-engagement strategy no. 1, recognises the
possibility of competing interpretive traditions even within the specific terms of
Islamic legal thought. Here, Muslims in all of their diversity are expected, even
encouraged, to disagree; but in doing so, they are merely encouraged to ‘battle it
out’ amongst themselves without any reference to, indeed, without any
possibility of, engagement with the US. This view was brought into mainstream
policy debates by Bernard Haykel (2005), a professor of Islamic Studies at New
York University.
This authenticising view, in which Muslims are left to battle it out amongst
themselves, leaves the notion of American diplomatic ‘engagement’ completely
out of the picture. As a matter of fact, Haykel explicitly urges the West to
‘refrain from interfering in this evolving debate’ in order to allow this
process*/that is, this internal debate among local Muslims*/to ‘take its course’.
Indeed, Haykel simply presumes that American diplomats will lack the
rhetorical sophistication required to support what Haykel describes as an
evolving (internal) debate. Even when American diplomats are not, strictly
speaking, counter-productive, in other words, they are, for the most part,
simply irrelevant. In fact the underlying premise of Haykel’s argument seems to
lie in suggesting that American diplomats are condemned to embrace a
rhetorical posture in which every conceivable ‘American’ perspective is defined
outside of, or apart from, the specific terms of ‘Islam’.
In the end, of course, Haykel maintains that so-called Muslim ‘moderates’
will prevail on their own. In fact, Haykel simply assumes that these moderates
will prevail even despite what amounts to an allergic reaction to all things
(legally) ‘Islamic’ in the West.3 In other words, Haykel calculates that the views
expressed by Muslim ‘moderates’ will succeed in siphoning off local Muslim
supporters even more quickly than enduring expressions of ‘Islamophobia’ can
succeed in turning those same supporters away from*/or against*/the West.
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7 It is entirely possible that Haykel is correct. Indeed, it is not inconceivable
that moderate-but-religious Muslims will succeed in marginalising the extre-
mists in their midst. But, even if this occurs, the question arises: where will these
moderate-but-religious Muslims go when they win? The strategy that Haykel
endorses merely succeeds in leaving the US completely set apart from any
pattern of active association with any ‘solution’ framed within the specific terms
of Islam.4
The question that emerges from a careful assessment of Haykel’s approach, in
other words, appears closely related to many of the questions posed above: why
can’t American foreign policy-makers begin, not merely to observe, but,
actually, to appreciate (and engage) the internal debates that Haykel so neatly
describes? Why can’t American foreign policy-makers embrace multiple
rhetorical paths to the same strategic destination, noting, for instance, that, in
keeping with the subject of Haykel’s article, the US is opposed to suicide
missions targeting unarmed civilians, not only because they offend American
notions of proper military engagement, but also, and perhaps more importantly,
because they offend a particular sense of Islamic ‘justice’ as expressed by several
Muslim scholars? Indeed, why must the US remain strictly set apart from those
who seek to articulate parallel (strategic) objectives in a different (legal)
language (see, for example, Appiah 2006; Marty 2005)?
Given the space for dialogue that exists even within the dynamic boundaries
of Islamic law, the answer is perfectly clear: there is no such requirement. There
is, in fact, no intrinsic reason why certain American views cannot be expressed
‘in the language of Islam’. The terms of American diplomatic rhetoric, in other
words, are not (inherently) opposed to contemporary expressions of Islam,
including contemporary expressions of Islamic law, Islamic jurisprudence, and
Islamic legal debate.
Non-engagement strategy no. 2: American law for everyone
The second way in which American foreign policy-makers have sought to
maintain a policy of strict segregation with respect to Islamic law and Islamic
jurisprudence*/non-engagement strategy no. 2*/is less interested in the nuances
of Islamic legal disputation or debate. In this view, Islamic law is simply set
aside (in toto) in favour of American laws. In other words, American laws and
American courts are regarded as sufficiently robust to prosecute the ‘war on
terror’ even without the help of secret military tribunals.
This view was articulated by Harold Koh (2001), a professor of law at Yale
University. Koh argued that if bin Laden were captured (rather than killed), the
US should strive ‘to show the world our commitment to the very rule of law that
the terrorists sought to undermine.’ In particular, drawing attention to
the political side of the ensuing conflict just as much as (if not more than) the
military side, Koh argued that American courts should be allowed to try bin
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7 Laden in an effort ‘to promote values that must stand higher than vengeance’
and, in doing so, to ‘demonstrate that civilized societies can provide justice for
even the most heinous outlaws.’ In short, Koh asked: ‘why not show the world
that American courts can give universal justice?’ (Koh 2001, emphasis added).
Legally speaking, Koh’s position appears quite reasonable. It would be
extremely difficult to ask American courts to adjudicate any dispute with
reference to anything other than American laws. But at the level of American
diplomatic rhetoric, Koh’s approach may be somewhat less persuasive. In fact,
Koh clearly fails to acknowledge the unique diplomatic advantages that might
have been expected to follow from a careful effort to combine ‘multiple’ legal lan-
guages in a ‘single’ counter-terrorism strategy. Indeed, when viewed from
Islamabad, Karachi, or Peshawar, it would not be an exaggeration to say that
Koh’s understandable legal reasoning played directly into the hands of those with
an interest in painting the US into an increasingly familiar (neo-imperialist)
corner: American courts, if you will, as the purveyors of universal justice, and so
on.
There is, however, another option. This option seeks to avoid these
accusations of neo-imperialism by allowing American courts to proceed*/as it
were, completely unimpeded*/in the language of American law, even as
American diplomats seek to prosecute the ‘war on terror’ in more than one
legal idiom at the same time. The advantages of this multi-pronged diplomatic
approach were not insignificant in the autumn of 2001. But, even as bin Laden
has been overshadowed by the war in Iraq*/indeed, even as al-Qaeda has
remade itself in light of the war in Iraq*/the benefits of this eclectic approach
have remained extremely robust.
Engaging Islamic law after 11 September: case studies (cartoons and conversion)
Two recent controversies that are simultaneously tangential to the war on terror
and, yet, politically speaking, absolutely central to it have emerged to highlight
the special advantages of this multi-pronged approach. The first of these two
controversies concerns the rather infamous Jyllens-Posten cartoons that
emerged, first in Denmark, then in Norway, and, eventually, around the world
(September 2005/February 2006). The second concerns the less-well-known
(Christian) conversion of Mr. Abdul Rahman in Afghanistan (March 2006) (see
also Wahid 2006).
Both of these controversies were fuelled by a specific sense that the US was not
merely set apart from, but actually opposed to, the sophisticated terms of fiqh,
and, more specifically, Islamic concerns regarding (a) blasphemy and (b)
apostasy. Indeed, both controversies illuminated a series of strategic pitfalls
associated with ongoing efforts to maintain a safe distance from the specific terms
of Islamic jurisprudence that could have been, and should have been, avoided.
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7 Engagement opportunity no. 1: cartoons
The first case*/engagement opportunity no. 1*/erupted when a small Danish
newspaper, the Jyllens-Posten, sought to challenge existing (Islamic) taboos
with the publication of several cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammad. One
of these cartoons, depicting the Prophet with a bomb tucked into his turban,
was especially controversial, and, even more than the others, this cartoon was
picked up and re-published in several additional newspapers around the world,
prompting violent protests from Karachi to Kuala Lumpur.
In their efforts to account for the specific terms of the ensuing conflagration,
however, many newspapers sought to avoid the Jyllens-Posten cartoons.
Instead, they turned to several additional paintings depicting the Prophet
Mohammad in a variety of different contexts*/receiving the Archangel Gabriel,
for instance, or travelling on his famous ‘night journey’ (al-isra) to Jerusalem.
(These paintings are frequently displayed in prominent museums throughout the
Muslim world.)
Few were condemned for adopting this alternative approach to the depiction
of the Prophet Mohammad. A closer look at the central legal questions revealed
a host of competing legal opinions*/some of which argued that depictions of
the Prophet, in any form, were strictly taboo; others of which argued that some
images were more acceptable than others. Unfortunately, most people went out
of their way to ignore the terms of this ensuing (legal) debate. Instead, they
reduced the controversy to what can only be described as ‘a caricature of itself’,
one that ignored a number of overlapping legal concerns regarding, say,
questions of ‘defamation’ or ‘hate speech’, in a deliberate effort to polarise, or
exacerbate, the underlying (political) clash: ‘Islam’, on the one hand; ‘free
speech’, on the other.
Haykel might have regarded the ensuing controversy as an ideal opportunity
to expose the terms of an ‘internal’ debate among Muslims. He might have
assumed that, in the end, moderate Muslim voices would prevail. Koh might
have argued that American (or European) courts were already well equipped to
handle the underlying question of ‘free speech’. He probably would have gone
out of his way to insist that, although the protestors*/indeed, Muslims around
the world*/might have been ‘aggrieved’, they were, nevertheless, simply out of
line when it came to the specific substance of existing local laws. After all,
cartoons published in Denmark were, strictly speaking, subject to the laws of
Denmark.
But again, when it comes to the question of contemporary diplomatic
rhetoric, the value of these two views deserves a closer look. In particular,
Haykel’s view regarding the likely success of local Muslim ‘moderates’ was
somewhat optimistic. Indeed, Muslim ‘moderates’ were not invisible in the
days, weeks, and months after the cartoons first appeared. As the controversy
expanded, then exploded, however, the problems associated with persistent,
almost relentless, expressions of Islamophobic bewilderment in the West
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7 became extremely difficult to contain or counteract. Without a different
platform for their views*/perhaps, a specifically American platform*/the views
expressed by local Muslim ‘moderates’ were almost completely crowded out of
an important and evolving debate. Koh’s view, on the other hand, simply
overlooked the possibility of any legal ‘conversation’ in between the views of
those in ‘Karachi’ and those in ‘København’. As mentioned above, Koh was
inclined to stress the fact that allegations lodged in Denmark were, strictly
speaking, subject to the laws of Denmark*/full stop.
A closer look at the legal space ‘in between’ the views of those in Karachi and
those in København, however, raises a number of interesting and important
questions. Isn’t it possible that a focused effort to express a common set of
concerns within multiple legal languages at the same time might have allowed
for a series of helpful rhetorical (and political) interventions designed to
highlight the relationship between (a) Danish notions of free speech and its
specific limitations, and (b) contemporary notions of fiqh that sought to
encourage some images but not others?5
Of course, the views expressed by Koh and Haykel were not entirely
incorrect; they were simply incomplete and, as such, extremely unhelpful. In
particular, they tended to reinforce the terms of an insurmountable gap between
(a) ‘Western’ efforts to address the question of free speech, and (b) emerging
debates regarding the specific terms of an ostensibly ‘inaccessible’ fiqh. In fact
even when these two perspectives seemed to overlap, the overlapping space ‘in
between’ them was often lost.
Engagement opportunity no. 2: conversion
The second controversy*/engagement opportunity no. 2*/is even more reveal-
ing. Here we encounter the case of Abdul Rahman, a Christian convert in
Kabul.
Rahman was born into a Muslim family and, throughout the Afghan war, he
lived in Pakistan, where he worked for a Christian humanitarian aid
organisation. In 1980, he converted to Christianity, but the fact of his
conversion was not publicly revealed until 2006, when he became embroiled
in a domestic dispute regarding the custody of his two daughters, at which point
Rahman was accused of conversion in an effort to suggest that he would not be
able to serve as a suitable father.
Of course, the ‘ulema in Afghanistan hastened to argue that the ‘Islamic’
punishment for conversion (read: ‘apostasy’) was death. And, within a matter of
days, their view was quickly reported around the world, giving the impression
that there was, in fact, one (and only one) ‘Islamic’ approach to the case at
hand. In due course, however, this view was vigorously disputed by several
religious scholars as well as hundreds of lay Muslims in various on-line forums.
But the terms of their Haykel-style ‘debate’ were scarcely mentioned in the
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7 mainstream press. (It was, after all, an ‘internal’ Muslim debate.) Instead,
readers were confronted with a debate in which the middle ground, defined in
terms of religious freedom*/and its specific limitations*/was almost completely
ignored.
The notion that religious freedom, like the freedom of speech, might be
defined with reference to specific ‘limitations’ is not at all uncommon. In India,
for instance, the notion of religious freedom is circumscribed by the terms of
public ‘order’ (Constitution of India, Article 25) and, in the US, religious
freedom is subject to the limiting idea of (constitutional) ‘non-establishment’
(Amendment 1). But again, this notion of religious freedom ‘constrained’ by
enduring concerns about various forms of public order and political sub-
version*/a notion deeply familiar to anyone with any interest in the history of
Islamic notions of apostasy*/was totally ignored (Griffel 2001). Once again, the
US simply failed to formulate a position in which the execution of a Christian
convert could have been opposed, not only because it offended our ideas about
religious freedom, but also because it offended our ideas about the fundamental
importance of ‘non-coercion’ in matters of faith and belief*/a formulation
closely related to the basic tenets of Islam (Qur’an 2:256).
In the end, Rahman was declared ‘insane’ and, therefore, unfit to stand trial.
But his release and, subsequently, his removal to Italy must be regarded as a
failure on at least two levels. On the one hand, his release was purchased at the
cost of a declaration regarding his ‘insanity’. In other words, the choice of a
‘convert’ (in the context of Islamic law) was reduced to that of a ‘lunatic’. In
addition, however, Rahman’s release was accompanied by yet another round of
anti-American protests*/protests in which the US and its allies in Italy were
accused of refusing to allow Islamic law to ‘run its course’. In other words, the
US and its allies were accused of proceeding against Islam, when they could
have seized the opportunity to show that they were actively for ‘some
interpretations of Islam’ (indeed, actively for interpretations that sought to
associate the terms of faith itself with those of freely given ‘consent’ as opposed
to ‘coercion’). Again, it seems, the US took one step forward (in terms of
Rahman) and two steps back (in terms of its larger, long-term aims).
Engaging Islamic law after 11 September: possibilities . . . and problems
The American rhetoric that emerged after 11 September suggested that, at least
initially, American policy-makers imagined a strictly secular future for the
Muslim world*/in many ways, a ‘secular democratic’ future modelled on the
experience of the United States. Unfortunately, this approach merely allowed
for the construction of a future in which American policy-makers were almost
completely cut out of the picture. In fact, tiny ‘secular’ minorities notwith-
standing, the terms of the existing political debate in a place like Afghanistan or
Iraq do not position (a) the terms of ‘secularism’ against (b) those of ‘Islam’.
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7 Rather, the terms of the existing debate routinely position one interpretation of
Islam against another: Sunni (Wahhabi, Deobandi, Barelwi, etc.); Shi’a (Jafari,
Ismaili, etc.); Sufi (Naqshbandi, Chishti, Qadiri, etc.); Arab Muslim Socialist
(Baathist); South Asian Muslim ‘modernist’ (Iqbal); and so on, up to and
including several different trajectories even within each of these traditions.
Unfortunately, when it comes to the specific terms of these evolving debates,
the US has spent most of the last five years insisting on a specific pattern of
strategic non-interference. But, as the critics of US foreign policy routinely and
correctly point out, American policy is not a policy of ‘non-interference’.
Instead, it amounts to a policy of rhetorical and political ‘non-engagement’.
The weaknesses associated with this enduring pattern of non-engagement,
however, are no longer invisible, and they have become increasingly difficult to
ignore. Two voices, in particular, have attracted considerable attention in the
context of recent calls for change: one belonging to those wishing to see greater
attention to the study of the Muslim world, including local languages, local
customs, and, at least potentially, the study of alternative forms of law; the
other belonging to those who already possess these skills*/namely, ‘area
studies’ experts and scholars ensconced in prominent faculties devoted to the
study of the Middle East, North Africa, and South and Southeast Asia.
Surprisingly, the message that has emerged from these two groups has tended
to move in opposite directions at the same time. Indeed, a brief encounter with
the first group might lead one to expect that individuals who obtain an
advanced level of proficiency in a strategic language like Arabic, Urdu, or Farsi,
undertake extensive fieldwork in Yemen, Pakistan, or Iran, and develop a
detailed understanding of Islamic society, would be in a strong position to
contribute to important policy debates. But the second group reminds us that
this is not always the case. In fact the second group reminds us that, even if the
number of Arabic, Urdu, or Farsi speakers were to increase (dramatically), only
a few of these speakers would be in a position to make themselves heard in
Washington (for a related example, see Hull 2004; Packer 2006: 96).
Two recent speeches draw attention to this rather surprising aversion to the
practical value of ‘area’ studies*/including the study of Islamic jurisprudence
and its many internal debates*/in the context of American foreign policy and
American diplomacy. The first of these two speeches was delivered by Susanne
Hoeber Rudolph, former president of the American Political Science Associa-
tion (APSA). Her APSA presidential address in 2004 took up the future of area
studies scholarship in terms of an unusually explicit statement regarding the link
between area studies, on the one hand, and contemporary public policy-making,
on the other. The second speech*/in many ways, anticipating the first*/was
delivered by Lisa Anderson, former president of the Middle East Studies
Association (MESA). Her MESA presidential address in 2003 was entitled
‘Scholarship, policy, debate, and conflict: why we study the Middle East and
why it matters’ (see Rudolph 2005; Anderson 2004).
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7 Speaking to an audience of several hundred political scientists in Chicago,
Rudolph urged her colleagues, many of whom serve as important policy advisors,
to allow more room for the study of local languages, more time for detailed
fieldwork, and a greater appreciation for the astonishing diversity of human
motivation and human behaviour, particularly in South Asia, North Africa, and
the Middle East. In effect, Rudolph argued, scholars trained to appreciate the
cultural, linguistic, historical, and religious details of the modern Muslim world
were desperately needed to guide those (namely, those in Washington)
responsible for constructing a new approach to American foreign policy.
What we need, Rudolph argued, is not a static model guided by more
elaborate statistics and conventional a priori assumptions. Instead, she noted,
following in the footsteps of several well-known scholars of Islamic law (and its
‘dynamic’ legal boundaries), what we need is an entirely new method*/in effect,
an entirely new way of illuminating, assessing, and engaging dynamic forms of
authority, shifting patterns of regulation, and ‘contextualised’ legal debates.
The challenge, she maintained, lay in bringing a deeper understanding of social,
cultural, political, and legal diversity throughout the Muslim world together
with a more nuanced approach to American foreign policy: area studies, if you
will, on the one hand; American diplomacy, on the other.
Anderson, speaking to her Arabic, Urdu, and Farsi-speaking colleagues in
2003, did not disagree. In fact, Anderson noted that scholars with specific ‘area’
expertise should remain deeply engaged in the process of American foreign
policy-making. Unfortunately, she went on to note that, in the wake of 11
September, many of those with precisely this type of ‘area’ expertise were
considerably less sanguine about their ability to make themselves heard above
the dull roar of domestic (partisan) politics. On the one hand, Anderson noted,
‘we all believe that knowledge, understanding, and issues of public moment
[indeed, policy making itself] should . . . be linked.’ And yet, she argued, the
terms of the current debate no longer considered ‘whether scholars and policy
makers [were in a position to] . . . acknowledge their mutual reliance.’ On the
contrary, she noted, the core of the existing debate was far more serious. As it
actually existed in Washington, the core of the debate concerned the extent to
which an understanding of ‘the facts on the ground’ (for example, the facts on
the ground in Iraq) should be considered important in the context of
contemporary public policy-making at all (Anderson 2003).
Quoting Robert Reischauer, a well-known scholar of American domestic
policy, Anderson noted that policy-making in Washington was increasingly
conceived through ‘the lenses of politics and ideology’. ‘Policies are Democrat
or Republican, liberal or conservative, [and so on]’; but the fundamental
question, ‘will the policy work?’ was frequently ignored (see, for example,
Chandrasekaran 2006). Of course, Anderson acknowledged that empirical
evidence alone would never be sufficient to provide any firm guarantee of
success; but without it, she maintained, policies were more likely to fail, because
‘they may not be grounded in the economic, institutional, or social reality of a
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7 problem.’ In other words, she noted, politically ‘acceptable’ does not necessarily
mean ‘effective’.
Both Anderson and Rudolph felt that a deeper understanding of the facts ‘on
the ground’ in various parts of the Muslim world would be helpful in the
context of contemporary foreign policy-making. But again, Anderson was
considerably less optimistic about the extent to which ‘area studies’ scholarship
would actually succeed in reaching its intended audience. She noted that, even if
area studies scholars were able to understand Islamic law in ways that allowed
them to work within multiple legal languages at the same time, even then the
domestic political climate in the US would very likely ensure that the terms of
Islamic law, Islamic jurisprudence, and Islamic legal debate were systematically
ignored in Washington. The problem, she explained, was not merely a problem
of legal knowledge, but one of political ideology and, more specifically, a
persistent attachment to American ideas regarding cultural and religious
authenticity*/what Bayart (2005) referred to as the ‘illusion’ of cultural and
religious ‘identity’.
Conclusion
Even if we understood Arabic, Urdu, or Farsi, even if we understood the
domestic political dynamics of Yemen, Pakistan, or Iran, even if we knew about
the nuances of Islamic law, Islamic jurisprudence, and Islamic legal debate,
would it really matter in Washington? Would those in the State Department be
in a position to place their understanding of Pakistan before their attachment to
politically important ‘swing voters’ in Peoria or Palm Beach?
Since 2001, the answers to these questions have been extremely difficult to
articulate in the affirmative. Today, American foreign policy is but a simple
extension of American domestic policy*/and, more specifically, the American
electoral cycle*/such that, in practice, American diplomatic rhetoric remains
sharply constrained by the terms of American domestic political debate
(Mastanduno 1996). And of course, more often than not, this domestic political
debate has become firmly bound up with the rhetoric of ‘authenticity’ itself:
‘Muslims and only Muslims should be authorized to persuade, or inspire, other
Muslims’. ‘Non-Muslims are politically and rhetorically excluded from this
process’. American diplomats are not in a position to ‘speak Muslim’. And so on.
To be sure, the practical barriers associated with a more nuanced pattern of
engagement with the dynamic terms of Islamic jurisprudence and Islamic legal
debate have not declined over time. On the contrary, they have probably
increased. The sunk costs associated with America’s ‘war on terror’, now widely
perceived to be a war ‘against Islam’, for instance, had not yet emerged in the
autumn of 2001. But today, one cannot be so naı¨ve as to believe that a specific
effort to embrace the terms of Islamic law, or, rather, some interpretations of
Islamic law, would not be viewed with considerable scepticism, not only in the
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7 US, but around the world. Indeed, times have changed and, in keeping with the
notion of ‘path dependency’, decisions taken since 2001 have made alternative
options increasingly difficult to consider (let alone adopt). Nevertheless, the
‘war on terror’ does not have to continue on its current course. This ‘war’ does
not have to be (or become) a war ‘against’ Islam.
Typically, when I suggest that American diplomats would do well to
understand, appreciate, or engage (rhetorically) discursive frameworks and
specific debates within the context of Islamic law, I am told that such an idea
will provoke fierce opposition. Indeed, on separate occasions, Muslims and
non-Muslims alike have responded to my comments, saying: ‘Look, this
boundary-crossing business sounds fine, but the majority [both Muslim and
non-Muslim] just won’t stand for it.’ The implication, of course, lies in
suggesting, first, that the public at large is even less open to new ideas than the
existing foreign policy establishment*/an empirical question that, I would
argue, deserves further study*/and, second, that scholars who seek to work
from ‘within’ multiple legal idioms in an effort to bridge the gap that lies ‘in
between’ them are simply stepping ‘out of line’. But the question is: how stable
are these ‘lines’?
Conventional wisdom suggests that these lines are ‘very stable indeed’. But, as
mentioned at the outset with specific reference to Bayart, this answer is
astonishingly inconsistent with the current state of the existing IR literature.
The answer that we encounter on the frontiers of the discipline and, for that
matter, within what is now regarded as ‘mainstream’ social theory, is
completely different and reminds us that the notion of ‘authenticity’ lying
behind the hesitant posture of so many policy-makers (including Blair) is
severely out of date. In the past, many believed that knowledgeable and sincere
non-Muslims who sought to appreciate the terms and traditions of Islamic
jurisprudence in an effort to bridge the gap between Muslim and non-Muslim
patterns of legal interpretation (and debate) might have been regarded as legal
‘aliens’. But today, scholars routinely acknowledge that, over the years, many
boundary-crossing non-Muslim scholars have intervened to serve as extremely
effective interlocutors*/see, for example, J.N.D. (Sir Norman) Anderson, N.J.
Coulson, Joseph Schacht and Lawrence Rosen, just to name a few.
Consider, for a moment, the legal leadership associated with people like
Mohandis K. Gandhi and Mohammad Ali Jinnah. As a lawyer called to the bar
at the Inner Temple in London, Gandhi was an accomplished practitioner of
English law. He used his training in the language of English law to engage a
rather specific set of British legal norms in the British colonial courts. And, of
course, he did so in an effort to oppose the British colonial state. When he spoke
to the British, in other words, he did so in a language that was already familiar
to them: ‘justice, equity, and good conscience’, and so on. But he did so in an
effort to highlight a set of norms that he considered universal (articulated within
the legal language of his opponents) while, at the same time, using his
articulation of those norms to express his opposition to the authoritarianism
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7 of British colonial rule*/preserving some aspects of the British tradition, if you
will, while rejecting many others.
Jinnah, Gandhi’s colleague (and, later, his adversary) was much the same.
As a lawyer called to the bar at Lincoln’s Inn, he spoke to the British in a legal
language they were already prepared to understand and appreciate. And when
he spoke to his fellow Muslims, he combined this language with terms that
drew upon the idioms of a rather specific South Asian Islam (khudi, khuda,
khudikhtiari, etc.). Like Gandhi, in other words, Jinnah embraced the
language of his opponents, and he used that language to articulate the terms
of a more focused and effective opposition*/first, with respect to the British,
who failed to protect and defend the underlying principles of ‘democracy’,
and, eventually, with respect to Gandhi himself, whose approach to
‘democracy’, Jinnah argued, failed to secure the interests of South Asia’s
sizable Muslim minority.
The terms of English law were never ‘alien’ or ‘exotic’ for these two lawyers.
Both Gandhi and Jinnah refused to believe that the terms of English law were
secured by any immutable or impenetrable boundaries. Instead, they main-
tained that the terms of English law and the work of the British courts were
open to debate, up to and including debates with the British themselves. The
terms of religion, in turn, were not incompatible with the pursuit of democracy.
In fact each in his own way remained ‘legally multi-lingual’.
In the years before 11 September, my experience in Pakistan was framed by
two simple facts that Gandhi and Jinnah would surely recognise and appreciate.
On the one hand, my experience was framed by the ubiquitous importance of
religion; in fact I quickly discovered that it would be nearly impossible to
communicate in Pakistan without a liberal use of religious allusions and a
healthy mix of religious idioms. But I was also impressed by the diversity of
religious expression that I encountered. To be sure, I was regularly informed that
‘there is only one Islam’. But this comment was repeatedly combined with a
closely related comment suggesting that that there can be ‘many different
interpretations within a single verse of poetry’. ‘We may not always acknowl-
edge these differences’, I was told, ‘but we always know they’re there’. Again, the
message was perfectly clear: there is only one Islam, but the terms of that Islam
come in many different forms. ‘Such is the majesty of God’s creation’, I was told.
Can we learn to appreciate this ‘single’ verse of poetry*/this exceedingly rich
and sophisticated verse of poetry*/in the context of American diplomatic
rhetoric? Can we, following Gandhi and Jinnah, learn to carve out a new
relationship with the Other in the language of the Other, preserving some things
while debating and discussing others? Can we, following Rudolph (2005), learn
to ‘recognize and negotiate with the unfamiliar’ in places like Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran? Can we be, or become, ‘legally multi-lingual’?
Will our foreign policy practice finally begin to reflect the terms of
contemporary IR theory? In many ways, the success of the US in the context
of its ongoing ‘war on terror’ will depend on it.
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7 Notes
1. Apparently, the London Metropolitan Police agree that efforts to engage the specific terms of
Islam could generate important diplomatic dividends, particularly in the context of ongoing
efforts to obtain useful information regarding potential terrorist attacks. ‘Behold!’ declared an
official police notice in East London, referring to a well-known saying, or hadith, attributed to
the Prophet Mohammad. ‘Fear from people should not prevent one from saying the truth if he
knows it.’ See Caldwell (2006).
2. The term ‘legal pluralism’ is often used to describe situations in which multiple forms of law
interact in the context of a single case. Ecclesiastical and civil courts, for example, often render
parallel judgements in cases of divorce. And of course, throughout the Muslim world, state-
supported civil courts routinely co-exist with the opinions rendered by local muftis. In other
words, this notion of parallel proceedings is not at all unprecedented*/particularly in the
Muslim world.
3. Examples of ‘Islamophobia’ might include persistent racial or religious profiling in the context
of various encounters with law enforcement officials or, perhaps, efforts to defend the notion
of secularism with explicit efforts to remove expressions of ‘Islam’ from the public sphere*/for
example, efforts to remove (completely) the loudspeakers that might be used to announce ‘the
Muslim call to prayer’ (azaan).
4. According to Mohammad Qasim Zaman, a leading scholar of Islamic law in South Asia, ‘a
different sort of reform might also be worth considering’. ‘This reform involves . . .
encouraging the ‘ulama to have a more vigorous engagement with facets of their own
tradition and encouraging them to debate among themselves and with others on these
grounds’ (emphasis added). ‘The idea of reform in this sense’, Zaman argues, ‘has largely
remained foreign to many Muslim modernist intellectuals and policy makers; and the reasons
for this are not far to seek.’ ‘These reasons’, he writes, ‘have much to do with the dim view of
the Islamic legal tradition that many of these modernists hold, which in turn is often a product
of the limited acquaintance they have with that tradition.’ In addition, Zaman explains that ‘as
its self-professed legatees and guardians, the ‘ulama of the contemporary world have
themselves often done little to improve others’ appreciation for, let alone their grounding
in, the Islamic tradition’. In fact, Zaman asserts:
A result of this set of circumstances is for Muslim modernists and policy makers to
often begin their reformist arguments by effectively writing off the tradition rather
than viewing it as an arena from where (or in which) varied internal reasons for
reform might in fact emerge. Yet it is in such internal reasons, with the ‘ulama as
crucial but scarcely the exclusive interlocutors, that the best prospects for reform
might lie*/reform that can have considerable implications for democracy, pluralism,
human rights, as well as for a whole range of other pressing issues confronting
Muslim societies today (Zaman 2005: 81/2).
5. For an introduction to relevant themes, potential points of convergence, and likely points of
divergence in the debate regarding ‘free speech,’ see Kamali (1997).
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